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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
V. 




The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d) (Supp. 2002), where this is an appeal from an interlocutory order 
entered in a court of record in a criminal case. Appellant Jeff Ray Harris petitioned for 
appeal from an interlocutory order of the trial court, entered on January 16, 2002. This 
Court granted the petition on April 29,2002. (R. 178-79.) A copy of the trial court's 
January 16, 2002 Order is attached as Addendum A, and a copy of this Court's April 29, 
2002 Order granting the petition for permission to appeal from an interlocutory order is 
attached as Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue presented for review is as follows: Whether the trial court erred when it 
ruled that it had an incomplete record of the preliminary hearing, and also, whether it 
erred when it ordered further evidentiary proceedings for the preliminary hearing. 
Standard of Review: The issue on review concerns an interpretation of a rule of 
law, and the bindover proceedings. This Court will interpret a rule of law without de-
ference to the trial court. State v. Redd, 1999 UT 108, ffljlO-1 1, 992 P.2d 986. It also will 
review a bindover issue as a question of law. State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, T|8, 20 P.3d 300. 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
The issue is preserved in the record on appeal at 44-45; 63-108; 131-39; 192. 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following provisions will be determinative of the issue on appeal: Utah R. 
Crim. P. 7 (2002); Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-401; 76-6-403; 76-6-404; 76-6-405 (1999). 
The text of those provisions is contained in the attached Addendum C. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below. 
In November 2000, the state filed an Information against Defendant Jeff Ray 
Harris (which was later amended), alleging one count of theft under Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-404 (1999). (R. 2-4; 31-33.) On April 12, 2001, the Honorable Denise Lindberg 
held a preliminary hearing in the matter (R. 29-30; 191), and bound Harris' case over for 
pretrial proceedings. (R. 29-30.) Thereafter, Harris filed a Motion to Quash, and the 
case was transferred to the Honorable Leslie Lewis. (R. 34-35; 44-45; 46-48; 50-53; 63-
108; 131-39.) 
On November 28, 2001, Judge Lewis considered the Motion to Quash and ruled on 
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the matter as follows: Judge Lewis indicated she was inclined to grant the Motion to 
Quash. However, she determined she had an incomplete record of the preliminary 
hearing. (R. 192:Tab 1:3-8; see infra note 1, herein.) Judge Lewis then entered an order 
for an evidentiary hearing to supplement the preliminary-hearing transcript. (Id.) 
On December 19, the defense filed a Motion to Reconsider, urging Judge Lewis (i) 
to accept the record presented to her from the preliminary hearing, (ii) to strike that 
portion of the order providing for a supplemental evidentiary hearing, and (iii) to grant 
the Motion to Quash. (R. 150-54.) On January 16, 2002, the trial judge entered an order 
reiterating the earlier ruling (R. 163), and this Court granted Harris' petition for 
permission to appeal from an interlocutory order. (R. 178-79.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The state charged Harris with theft. At a preliminary hearing, the state presented 
the following evidence. 
Kristine Praag testified that her family lived in a new home in Salt Lake County. 
(R. 191:1; see also R. 191:14 (testimony of Eric Praag).) She was involved in building 
the home and was approached by Harris to bid on cabinets for the home. (R. 191:1-2.) 
Mrs. Praag informed Harris that "we already had placed the contract with another 
company and [] we were probably going to go with them." (R. 191:2.) Harris asked if he 
could "at least" submit a bid, and Mrs. Praag agreed to let him. (R. 19:2.) 
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On May 3, 2000, Harris submitted a bid to install cabinets with cherry wood facing 
throughout the home for the price of $14,100. (R. 191:3.) The Praags agreed to the terms 
and entered into a contract with Harris. (R. 191:3, 14-15.) Harris requested half of the 
money up front, and according to Mrs. Praag, he was to complete the work by July 21, 
2000. (R. 191:3.) 
Later that month, on or about May 17, Mrs. Praag contacted Harris and expressed 
concern with his ability to do the work. (R. 191:4.) Harris told her not to worry. (R. 
191:4-5.) Mrs. Praag testified that Harris "blew it off," and he assured her that the 
cabinets would be ready on schedule. Shortly thereafter, Harris told Mrs. Praag that the 
cabinets were "a third of the way done." (Id.) 
On July 13, Mrs. Praag met with Harris and he admitted that he had not started the 
work on the cabinets. (R. 191:6.) When Mrs. Praag asked about the money they had 
given to Harris, he told them he spent it. (R. 191:6.) On July 14, the Praags terminated 
the contract with Harris, as set forth in a letter that stated in sum the following: 
The letter basically says that we felt at that time that Mr. Harris [had] stolen our 
money, and that he is to repay the money by July 21st. And if- at that time, Mr. 
Harris told us that he was not able to pay the money back by July 21st. And said, if 
you can just give me more time, I promise I will pay you back. And we said, okay, 
we are willing to work with you, you know, we just, we want you to do the right 
thing. And so we went ahead and scratched out on this original copy that he didn't 
need to pay us back by the 21st, that we would extend that until August 18th when 
the time to pay the other cabinet contractor came due. Because we knew we had 
30 days at least to pay this other contractor that we had to -
(R. 191:7-8.) 
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At approximately that point in the proceedings, the recording equipment for the 
preliminary hearing malfunctioned. (See R. 191:8.) Thus, Mrs. Praag's remaining direct 
examination and cross examination were not recorded. As a result, defense counsel and 
the prosecutor stipulated that Mrs. Praag testified to the following additional facts at the 
preliminary hearing (hereinafter the "Stipulated Facts"): 
1) Mr. Harris did not pay the Praags the $7,000 he had agreed to refund. 
2) The contract entered into between the Praags and Mr. Harris provided for a $50 
"late penalty" against Mr. Harris after July 21st if delay on the part of Mr. Harris 
caused delay in closing on the Praags' house. 
(R. 61-62.) The recording equipment apparently became operational again. 
Next, Kim Brown testified for the state. She was the general contractor / builder 
for the Praag home. (R. 191:8-9.) On May 10,2000, Brown prepared a check in the 
amount of $7,000 for Harris. (R. 191:10-11.) Brown instructed Harris not to cash the 
check until there were funds in the account. On May 15, Brown gave Harris permission 
to deposit the check. (Id.) Brown testified that it is not out of the ordinary for a 
subcontractor to ask for a portion of the payment up front. (R. 191:13.) 
Finally, Glenn Williams of Sandy City Police testified. Williams was contacted by 
the Praags because, f,[t]hey were having cabinets built, had paid a substantial sum of 
money to a contractor to build those. When he did not fulfill that part of the contract, 
they were unable to get the money back, so they thought it was a theft." (R. 191:16.) 
Williams investigated the matter and contacted Harris on October 25. (R. 191:17.) 
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During the investigation, Williams asked if Harris had actually started work on the 
cabinets. Harris told him that he had started the work, but now, he was using some of the 
wood "on another job after [the Praags] fired him, and that once he had the other job 
finished, he would have the money to pay them back." (R. 191:18.) 
Harris provided Williams with the names of two companies where he had 
purchased supplies for cabinets: "Hardwoods Inc. Utah" and "Intermountain Wood 
Products" in St. George. (R. 191:18.) Williams contacted those companies and obtained 
invoices from them. (R. 191:19-23.) He testified that the invoices failed to reflect an 
order for cherry wood. (R. 191:21 -23.) 
At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Lindberg bound the case over for trial on 
the charge of theft. (R. 191:27.) Thereafter, counsel for the defense filed a Motion to 
Quash (R. 34-35; 44-45; 63-108; 131-39), and the case was transferred to Judge Lewis. 
Judge Lewis held a hearing on the Motion to Quash and stated she was inclined to grant 
the motion. The judge also stated she had an incomplete record of the preliminary 
hearing due to a malfunction in the recording equipment. (R. 192: Tab 1:3.) 
When defense counsel informed the judge that the parties considered the record to 
be complete, the judge indicated she wanted to observe the demeanor of the witnesses 
herself, and she ordered an evidentiary hearing to supplement the preliminary-hearing 
transcript. The judge in essence rejected the "Stipulated Facts." (R. 192: Tab 1:3-5.) 
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Harris filed a Motion to Reconsider. The trial judge then issued an order that 
stated the following: 
Defendant's argument on the defendant's Motion to Quash the bindover was heard 
on November 28, 2001. The transcript of the Preliminary Hearing was provided, 
however, it is incomplete due to technical difficulties during the hearing. The 
State and the defendant have stipulated to the testimony which was absent from the 
transcript, and provided that stipulation to the Court. The Court is not satisfied 
that the evidence presented supports the bindover, and will hear the live testimony 
which was not recorded in the transcript, along with any other live testimony the 
State would like to present. The Court will rely on the live testimony presented 
and the transcript from the Preliminary Hearing. The case will not be remanded 
to Judge Lindberg. 
(R. 163 (emphasis added).)1 
1 To the extent there is confusion as to whether Judge Lewis granted the Motion to 
Quash, the record reflects the following: Judge Lewis initially indicated that she was 
inclined to grant the Motion. (R. 192: Tab 1:3.) She also made reference to an 
incomplete record (id. (Judge Lewis stated the facts were deficient due to an incomplete 
record)), "omissions" in the record (R. 192: Tab 1:4), and "the [paucity] of the full 
record." (R. 192: Tab 1:5.) Thus, it seems Judge Lewis was inclined to grant the Motion 
because she believed she did not have a complete record of the preliminary hearing. 
After Judge Lewis made her initial ruling, counsel for Harris filed a Motion to 
Reconsider, and advised the court that the record for the preliminary hearing was 
complete. (R. 150-55) Counsel then asked the court to "rule on the Motion to Quash 
based solely on the evidence before the court at this point." (R. 154.) The state 
responded by also asking the trial court to rule on the Motion to Quash. (R. 166-67 ("the 
record presented is [as] complete as possible").) 
Judge Lewis then entered a subsequent order, dated January 16, 2002. That order 
did not indicate whether the court would grant the Motion to Quash. Rather, the court 
ordered supplemental proceedings, and it ruled it would rely on the "live testimony" and 
the preliminary hearing transcript in determining the matter. (R. 163.) In essence, the 
court was rejecting the "Stipulated Facts" as prepared by counsel. Harris is appealing 
from that ruling. 
7 
Harris requested that this Court review the ruling of the trial court. (Petition for 
Permission to Appeal from an Interlocutory Order, dated February 1,2002.) This Court 
granted Harris' request. (See Addendum B, hereto.) Additional facts related to this 
appeal are set forth below. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In considering a motion to quash the bindover, the trial court in this case indicated 
it was inclined to grant the motion; it also determined the record for the preliminary 
hearing was incomplete. The trial court in essence rejected the "Stipulated Facts" of 
record, and then ordered another evidentiary hearing to supplement the original 
proceedings. The trial court specified that the state would be able to present any evidence 
it would like at the supplemental hearing, and the court would make credibility 
determinations with respect to the witnesses and the evidence. The trial court's ruling 
was in error for several reasons. 
First, the trial court had a complete record of the preliminary hearing: it was not at 
liberty to reject the "Stipulated Facts." The Utah Supreme Court has specified that a court 
is bound by party stipulations unless specified conditions have been met. The specified 
conditions were not in issue here. The trial court should have accepted the "Stipulated 
Facts" as part of the complete record, and ruled on the Motion to Quash. 
Next, according to Utah law, in considering a motion to quash, a trial court may 
not make credibility determinations with respect to the evidence. The court may only 
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assess whether a case was properly bound over to the trial court for further proceedings. 
In that regard, the trial court's order here to supplement the proceedings was improper. 
Also, the trial court's order for a supplemental evidentiary hearing served to 
circumvent the standards set forth in State v. Brickev. 714 P.2d 644, 647 (Utah 1986). 
According to Brickev, the state may be entitled to further proceedings at the preliminary-
hearing stage if the prosecutor is able to show that "new or previously unavailable 
evidence has surfaced or that other good cause justifies refiling." Id. Due process 
considerations and fundamental fairness preclude further proceedings unless that 
showing has been made. In this case, the state failed to make the requisite showing. 
Thus, it was not entitled to a supplemental evidentiary hearing. 
Finally, this Court should remand the case in order that the trial court may assess 
the evidence set forth in the preliminary hearing transcript together with the "Stipulated 
Facts" to determine whether probable cause existed for the bindover. In the event this 
Court determines to make that assessment itself, it should find that the evidence here is 
insufficient. The state failed to establish that Harris obtained "unauthorized control" 
over the Praags' funds for "theft," and it failed to establish deception. Thus, the 
information should be dismissed. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT JUDGE HAD A COMPLETE RECORD OF THE 
PRELIMINARY HEARING. IT ERRED WHEN IT REJECTED THE 
"STIPULATED FACTS." AND WHEN IT ENTERED AN ORDER TO 
SUPPLEMENT THE PRELIMINARY-HEARING TRANSCRIPT WITH 
ANY TESTIMONY THE STATE WISHED TO PRESENT. 
A. THE RECORD OF THE PRELIMINARY HEARING WAS COMPLETE. 
1. The Court Was Bound bv the "Stipulated Facts." 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that "[o]rdinarily, courts are bound by 
stipulations between parties." First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. C.N. Zundel & 
Assocs.. 600 P.2d 521, 527 (Utah 1979). 
An exception to that rule is when the parties have stipulated to an interpretation of 
the law. Courts will not be bound by such an interpretation. Adkins v. Uncle Bart's. 
Inc.. 2000 UT 14,11(34-40,1 P.3d 528 (ruling that court is not bound by stipulations 
between parties when points of law requiring judicial determinations are involved; here, 
court could not be bound by parties' stipulation that Dramshop Act provided a cause of 
action for wrongful death), cert, denied. 531 U.S. 1011 (2000); Moonev v. GR and 
Assoc. 746 P.2d 1174, 1178 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (recognizing parties cannot stipulate 
to points of law). 
Also, a court may set aside a stipulation only when the following conditions have 
been met: a party has requested relief from the stipulation by filing a timely motion with 
the court showing justifiable cause for the relief, or showing that the stipulation was 
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entered into inadvertently. If the court grants the relief, it must state its basis for doing 
so. See Yeargin, Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission. 2001 UT 
11,1(21,20 P.3d 287. Where the standard for withdrawing a stipulation is not met, the 
trial court is bound by the stipulation. It is not at liberty to reject it. 
In Dove v. Cude. 710 P.2d 170 (Utah 1985), the plaintiff obtained a default 
judgment against defendants after defendants failed to respond to plaintiffs defective 
complaint and summons. Defendants sought to have the judgment set aside, but were 
unsuccessful. When the defendants indicated an intent to appeal the trial court's ruling, 
the plaintiff filed a stipulation "agreeing to have the default judgment set aside and the 
case set for trial." IdL at 171. Five months after the stipulation was filed, the plaintiff 
moved to withdraw it. The trial court granted that request over the objection of the 
defendants. IcL The Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court's ruling and reiterated 
that courts are bound by stipulations between parties. IcL Also, parties are bound by 
such stipulations unless they obtain timely and proper relief from the court. Id. at 171. 
The rule of law as it relates to party stipulations applies here, as further explained 
below. See infra, subpart B., below. 
2. The Standards and Rules Applicable to Preliminary Hearings. 
Rule 7, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides in relevant part the following: 
(g)(1) If a defendant is charged with a felony, the defendant shall be advised of the 
right to a preliminary examination. If the defendant waives the right to a 
preliminary examination, and the prosecuting attorney consents, the magistrate 
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shall order the defendant bound over to answer in the district court. 
(2) If the defendant does not waive a preliminary examination, the magistrate shall 
schedule the preliminary examination. The examination shall be held within a 
reasonable time, but not later than ten days if the defendant is in custody for the 
offense charged and not later than 30 days if the defendant is not in custody. 
These time periods may be extended by the magistrate for good cause shown. A 
preliminary examination may not be held if the defendant is indicted. 
(h)(1) Unless otherwise provided, a preliminary examination shall be held under 
the rules and laws applicable to criminal cases tried before a court. The state has 
the burden of proof and shall proceed first with its case. At the conclusion of the 
statefs case, the defendant may testify under oath, call witnesses, and present 
evidence. The defendant may also cross-examine adverse witnesses. 
(2) If from the evidence a magistrate finds probable cause to believe that the crime 
charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed it, the 
magistrate shall order, in writing, that the defendant be bound over to answer in the 
district court. The findings of probable cause may be based on hearsay in whole or 
in part. Objections to evidence on the ground that it was acquired by unlawful 
means are not properly raised at the preliminary examination. 
(3) If the magistrate does not find probable cause to believe that the crime 
charged has been committed or that the defendant committed it, the magistrate 
shall dismiss the information and discharge the defendant. The magistrate may 
enter findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order of dismissal The 
dismissal and discharge do not preclude the state from instituting a subsequent 
prosecution for the same offense. 
(i) At a preliminary examination, the magistrate, upon request of either party, may 
exclude witnesses from the courtroom and may require witnesses not to converse 
with each other until the preliminary examination is concluded. On the request of 
either party, the magistrate may order all spectators to be excluded from the 
courtroom. 
(j)(l) If the magistrate orders the defendant bound over to the district court, the 
magistrate shall execute in writing a bind-over order and shall transmit to the clerk 
of the district court all pleadings in and records made of the proceedings before the 
magistrate, including exhibits, recordings, and any typewritten transcript. 
12 
Utah R. Crim. P. 7 (2002) (emphasis added). 
With respect to the "magistrate's role" in a preliminary hearing, the Utah Supreme 
Court has stated the following: 
"[T]he magistrate's role in evaluating th[e] evidence is limited.... '[T]he 
magistrate should view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution 
and resolve all inferences in favor of the prosecution.' State v. Talbot, 972 P.2d 
435, 438 (Utah 1998) (quoting State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 
1995))." 
State v. Hawatmeh. 2001 UT 51, Tf3, 26 P.3d 223. That is, "'[w]hen faced with con-
flicting evidence, the magistrate may not sift or weigh the evidence . . . but must leave 
those tasks "to the fact finder at trial.'"" State v. Clark. 2001 UT 9, U10,20 P.3d 300 
(cites omitted). 
Also, "the magistrate's evaluation of credibility at a preliminary hearing is limited 
to determining that '"evidence is wholly lacking and incapable of reasonable inference to 
prove some issue which supports the [prosecution's] claim.'"" Talbot. 972 P.2d at 438 
(quoting Pledger. 896 P.2d at 1229; Cruz v. Montova. 660 P.2d 723, 729 (Utah 1983)). 
The trial court may not weigh the evidence and the court is precluded from evaluating the 
weight of otherwise credible evidence. Talbot. 972 P.2d at 438. 
"Additionally, '"[u]nless the evidence is wholly lacking and incapable of 
reasonable inference to prove some issue which supports the [prosecution's] claim," the 
magistrate should bind the defendant over for trial.'" Talbot. 972 P.2d at 438 (cites 
omitted). To be clear, the magistrate's role in the process "'while limited, is not that of a 
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rubber stamp for the prosecution . . . Even with this limited role, the magistrate must 
attempt to ensure that all "groundless and improvident prosecutions" are ferreted out no 
later than the preliminary hearing.9" Clark. 2001 UT 9, TflO (cites omitted). 
The Utah Supreme Court also has recognized the inherent authority of a district 
court judge to assess bindover proceedings, via a motion to quash. The purpose of the 
motion to quash is to allow the district court judge to determine whether jurisdiction has 
been properly invoked. 
A magistrate issues a bindover order after a preliminary hearing upon finding that 
there is probable cause to believe the defendant has committed the crime charged 
in the information. See Utah R.Crim.P. 7(8)(b). By the bindover order, the 
magistrate requires the defendant "to answer [the information] in the district 
court." Id. The information is then transferred to the district court, permitting that 
court to take original jurisdiction of the matter. At that point, the district court has 
the inherent authority and the obligation to determine whether its original 
jurisdiction has been properly invoked. In doing so, the district court need show 
no deference to the magistrate's legal conclusion, implicit in the bindover order, 
that the matter may proceed to trial in district court, but may conduct its own 
review of the order. 
State v. Humphrey. 823 P.2d 464, 465-66 (Utah 1991) (note omitted); s_ee_ also id. at 466 
n.3. In this case, the standards identified above apply. See infra, subpoint B., below. 
Next, with respect to the state's role in a preliminary hearing, the Utah Supreme 
Court has stated the following: 
At a preliminary hearing, "the State must show 'probable cause1... by fpresent[ing] 
sufficient evidence to establish that "the crime charged has been committed and 
that the defendant has committed it."'" Clark, 2001 UT 9 at fflflO-11, 20 P.3d 300 
(clarifying the question of what constitutes sufficient evidence to support a 
finding of probable cause at a preliminary hearing) (quoting State v. Pledger, 896 
P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 1995) (quoting Utah R.Crim. P. 7(h)(2))). To prevail at 
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this stage, the prosecution must: 
produce believable evidence of all the elements of the crime charged, just 
as it would have to do to survive a motion for a directed verdict. 
However, unlike a motion for a directed verdict, this evidence need not be 
capable of supporting a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Instead,... the quantum of evidence necessary to support a bindover is less 
than that necessary to survive a directed verdict motion. 
Clark 2001 UT 9 at Ifij 15-16, 20 P.3d 300 (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). 
Recently, in State v. Clark, we specified that at the preliminary hearing stage, the 
magistrate should apply the same probable cause standard as that applied at the 
arrest warrant stage. See id at ^ f 16. Under this standard, "the prosecution must 
present sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been 
committed and that the defendant committed it." Id. [citing State v. Anderson, 612 
P.2d 778, 783-84 (Utah 1980)] (emphasis added). 
Hawatmeh. 2001 UT 51, fflfl4-15 (footnote omitted). Those standards also apply here, as 
further explained below. See infra, subpart B., below. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ESSENTIALLY REJECTED THE "STIPULATED 
FACTS." THAT WAS IMPROPER. IN ADDITION. THE TRIAL COURT 
IMPROPERLY RULED THAT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING SHOULD BE 
SUPPLEMENTED WITH ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE. 
In this case, the state charged Harris with theft. (R. 2-4; 31-33.) After the pre-
liminary hearing, Judge Lindberg found probable cause to bind the matter over for trial. 
(R. 29-30.) The defense then prepared a Motion to Quash for filing with the district court 
judge. (R. 34-35; 63-108.) In connection with preparing that motion, the parties learned 
that the recording equipment for the preliminary hearing malfunctioned during Mrs. 
Praag's testimony. The prosecutor and defense counsel prepared a set of "Stipulated 
Facts" for the court to constitute a complete record of the evidence presented at the 
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preliminary hearing. (R. 61-62.) 
The defense presented the Motion to Quash to Judge Lewis. After argument on 
the matter, Judge Lewis stated she was inclined to grant the motion. However, she 
believed she had an incomplete record of the preliminary hearing. (R. 192: Tab 1:3, 5.) 
Judge Lewis then ordered a supplemental evidentiary hearing in the case; she claimed she 
needed to assess the demeanor of the witnesses as they testified. (R. 192: Tab 1:4.) 
Judge Lewis essentially rejected the "Stipulated Facts" as part of the record. That ruling 
was incorrect for several reasons. 
First, Judge Lewis had a complete record of the preliminary hearing. She was not 
at liberty to reject the "Stipulated Facts." "Ordinarily, courts are bound by stipulations 
between parties." First of Denver Mtg. Investors. 600 P.2d at 527. A court may not set 
aside a stipulation unless a proper motion is made by one of the parties showing 
inadvertence or justifiable cause. See Yeargin. Inc.. 2001 UT 11, [^21. 
In this case, the "Stipulated Facts" were signed by both the prosecutor and counsel 
for the defendant. "It is unlikely that a stipulation signed by counsel and filed with the 
court was entered into inadvertently." Dove, 710 P.2d at 171. Thus, the "Stipulated 
Facts" signed by both attorneys was binding on the court and the parties. See id. The 
"Stipulated Facts" completed the record for the preliminary hearing. Where Judge Lewis 
had a complete record, she should have ruled on the Motion to Quash,, 
Second, Judge Lewis ordered the supplemental hearing so that she could assess 
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the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses. That was improper. The bindover 
standard requires the judge to consider the facts and inferences presented at the 
preliminary hearing in the light most favorable to the state. Hawatmeh. 2001 UT 51, ^3. 
The judge may not make credibility determinations since those determinations must be 
left '"to the fact finder at trial.'" Clark, 2001 UT 9,1J10 (cite omitted). Judge Lewis was 
not required to make credibility determinations. Her role was limited to assessing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, %3. 
Also, a motion to quash raises a question of jurisdiction in the district court. In 
considering a motion to quash, the district court judge has the authority "and the 
obligation to determine whether its original jurisdiction has been properly invoked." 
Humphrey, 823 P.2d at 465-66. Such a determination concerns a review of the prelimi-
nary hearing proceedings. Id at 466. Logically, if the evidence fails to support the 
bindover, the district court lacks jurisdiction to proceed with the matter and must dismiss 
the case. 
In that regard, Judge Lewis' authority in this case encompassed review only of the 
procedure by which the matter came before the district court. Humphrey, 823 P.2d at 
466. If the evidence failed to support the bindover, the district court lacked jurisdiction 
to proceed with the case. If the district court's jurisdiction was not properly invoked, the 
district court would not have jurisdiction to take any additional evidence that the state 
wished to present in supplemental proceedings. Thus, the trial court's order for 
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supplemental proceedings was in error. 
Third, the law does not allow for supplemental evidentiary proceedings as ordered 
in this case. Specifically, Rule 7(h)(1) requires preliminary hearings to be held "under 
the rules and laws applicable to criminal cases tried before a court. The state has the 
burden of proof and shall proceed first with its case." Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h)(1) (2002). 
At the conclusion of the state's case, the defendant may testify or present witnesses. Id. 
The rules do not provide for additional, supplemental evidentiary proceedings. 
Thereafter, if from the evidence the judge finds probable cause, the case shall 
proceed to trial. Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h)(2) (2002). If the judge does not find probable 
cause "to believe that the crime charged has been committed or that the defendant 
committed it, the magistrate," or the trial judge reviewing the motion to quash 
(Humphrey, 823 P.2d at 465-466), "shall dismiss the information and discharge the 
defendant." Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h)(3) (emphasis added). The language of Rule 7(h)(3) is 
mandatory. The rules do not provide for supplemental evidentiary proceedings. 
Once the case is dismissed, the prosecutor has the discretion to institute a 
"subsequent prosecution" for the same offense. Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h)(3). However, the 
prosecutor's discretion is limited. The prosecutor may not institute a subsequent 
prosecution unless s/he is able to "showr that new or previously unavailable evidence has 
surfaced or that other good cause justifies refiling." Brickey, 714 P.2d at 647. 
The "Brickev" standard provides protection against prosecutorial abuse and it 
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ensures due process. "[D]ue process considerations prohibit a prosecutor from refiling 
criminal charges earlier dismissed for insufficient evidence" unless the prosecutor can 
justify the filing and the additional proceedings under the "Brickey" standard. Idj 
see also State v. Morgan. 2001 UT 87, ffl[14-15, 34 P.3d 767 (if the state intentionally 
withholds evidence, that is not good cause for a new preliminary hearing); State v. Redd. 
2001 UT 113,1fl[16-17, 20, 37 P.3d 1160 (where the state fails to present "a scintilla of 
evidence" on one of the elements of the crime, refiling in that instance presumptively 
violates the due process rights of defendant). 
In the instant case, Judge Lewis ordered a supplemental evidentiary hearing that 
allowed the state to present whatever evidence it wished. (R. 192: Tab 1:3-4; 163 (ruling 
that the state may present any live testimony it "would like to present").) Such an order 
without limitation is unlawful. See Redd, 2001 UT 113, ^ [13 (due process precludes 
additional proceedings '"without limitation" in the preliminary-hearing stage). Here, the 
trial court did not limit the supplemental evidentiary hearing to evidence that was 
presented at the original proceedings but not recorded. In addition, the judge did not 
limit the supplemental evidentiary hearing to permit the state to present previously 
unavailable evidence, as permitted under Brickey. 714 P.2d at 647. 
In this case, the judge effectively circumvented the "Brickey" standard by entering 
an order to allow the prosecutor to present any additional evidence s/he wished in the 
matter. Such an order disregards the checks and balances on the system that ensure 
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fundamental fairness and due process. See Morgan, 2001 UT 87, fflfl 1-13 (the "Brickev" 
standard ensures the proper balance, where the state may present new or additional evi-
dence in connection with the preliminary hearing only in limited circumstances). Consi-
derations of fundamental fairness preclude providing the prosecutor with such unbridled 
discretion in subsequent proceedings at the preliminary-hearing stage. See Brickey. 714 
P.2d at 647. In that regard, Judge Lewis' ruling in this case violated Brickev. 
The trial court's order of January 16, 2002, in part was improper. The trial court 
ruled the preliminary-hearing record was "incomplete" and it ordered an evidentiary 
hearing to supplement the preliminary-hearing transcript. That was error. The trial court 
had a complete record on the matter. The trial court should have ruled on the Motion to 
Quash based on the preliminary hearing transcript and the "Stipulated Facts." 
Harris respectfully requests that this Court enter an order vacating that portion of 
the trial court's order providing for the supplemental, evidentiary proceedings. Also, 
Harris respectfully requests that this Court direct the trial court to rule on the Motion to 
Quash based on the transcript of the existing preliminary hearing and the "Stipulated 
Facts." In the event the trial court determines on the record before it that the evidence is 
sufficient for a bindover, it may proceed to trial with the matter. If there is insufficient 
evidence before the court to support the bindover order, the trial court must dismiss the 
case. Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h)(3). If the case is dismissed, the prosecutor may have the 
opportunity to refile the charges under the proper "Brickev" standard and the rules. 
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C. THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE BINDOVER. 
The trial court should decide the Motion to Quash in the first instance on the 
"Stipulated Facts" and the preliminary hearing transcript, as set forth above. "[I]t is 
always proper for a trial court, as a threshold jurisdictional matter, to consider whether it 
has jurisdiction over a criminal defendant." Humphrey, 823 P.2d at 468. This Court 
simply should reverse the trial court's order as requested above, and remand this case "to 
the district court[] for consideration of the merits of the motion[] to quash." IcL 
In the event this Court considers it necessary to address the merits of the Motion 
to Quash, it should find that the state's evidence here was insufficient to support the 
bindover, as further explained below. 
1. Utah's Theft Provisions. 
The state charged Harris with theft. The Utah Code defines the crime of theft as 
follows: "A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the 
property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 
(1999). The Code also defines relevant phrases as follow: 
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious object: 
(a) To withhold property permanently or for so extended a period or to use under 
such circumstances that a substantial portion of its economic value, or of the use 
and benefit thereof, would be lost; or 
(b) To restore the property only upon payment of a reward or other compensation; 
or 
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(c) To dispose of the property under circumstances that make it unlikely that the 
owner will recover it. 
(4) "Obtain or exercise unauthorized control" means, but is nol necessarily limited 
to, conduct heretofore defined or known as common-law larceny by trespassory 
taking, larceny by conversion, larceny by bailee, and embezzlement. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401 (1973 & 1999); see also State v. Shonka. 279 P.2d 711,713 
(Utah 1955) (identifying elements of larceny as follows: "(I) taking and (2) carrying 
away of the (3) personal property [] (4) of another (5) by trespass without the owner's 
consent (6) with the intent to steal"); State v. Aures, 127 P.2d 872 (Utah 1942) 
(identifying embezzlement as fraudulent conversion of property by one who is entrusted 
as "'bailee, tenant or lodger, or with any power of attorney,'" where such person 
converted property to his own use); Black's Law Dictionary 540 (7th ed. 1999) (defining 
common law embezzlement as fraudulent taking of property by one who is a fiduciary). 
The Utah consolidated theft statute also is relevant here. It states the following: 
Conduct denominated theft in this part constitutes a single offense embracing the 
separate offenses such as those heretofore known as larceny, larceny by trick, 
larceny by bailees, embezzlement, false pretense, extortion, blackmail, receiving 
stolen property. An accusation of theft may be supported by evidence that it was 
committed in any manner specified in Sections 76-6-404 through 76- 6-410, 
subject to the power of the court to ensure a fair trial by granting a continuance or 
other appropriate relief where the conduct of the defense would be prejudiced by 
lack of fair notice or by surprise. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-403 (1999). 
In construing the various theft provisions set forth above, this Court has 
recognized that "the consolidated theft statute is designed to 4eliminate[] the distinctions 
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and technicalities previously existing, recognizing one crime of theft and incorporating 
therein all crimes involving the taking or obtaining of personal property without force.'" 
State v. Bush. 2001 UT App 10, ^ [12,47 P.3d 69 (citing State v. Tavlor. 570 P.2d 697, 
698 (Utah 1977)). 
This Court also has stated that the purpose of the consolidated theft statute "is not 
to allow the State to avoid the substantive safeguards contained in Rule 4 [for sufficient 
pleading by information]. Rather, the consolidated theft statute is designed to prevent a 
defendant from escaping an otherwise valid theft charge on a mere technicality in the 
pleadings." Bush. 2001 UT App 10, TJ15. 
To that end, the state may allege general theft and then refine its theory for a 
specific variation of theft if it turns out that the evidence supports such a variation. 
See id. at ^ [15-16. This Court stated the following with regard to the general theft 
provision and the alternative theories: 
If it turns out, as is the case here, that the State's initial theory of theft is not 
supported by the evidence and a different theory is warranted, the State should not 
be foreclosed from changing the theory of theft simply because it attempted to 
provide more information in the initial charge. The purpose of the consolidated 
theft statute is to allow the State to change its theory of the crime when it later 
determines the evidence supports a different theory. In so holding, however, we 
reiterate that allowing the State to amend the charge is always subject to a 
defendant's right to fair notice. 
Bush,2001UT App 10,1(23. 
The state's ability to amend the information to reflect a specific or an alternative 
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theft theory is subject to defendant's right to know the nature of the accusation so that 
defendant is able to prepare a defense. IdL at ffi|16, 23-24. That means, if the state alleges 
general theft and has not indicated at the preliminary hearing its intent to pursue a specific 
theory, the defendant may not be on notice of the nature of the accusation against him to 
allow him the "opportunity to assail the sufficiency of the complaint." Id. at ^ [27. If the 
state later discloses its specific theory for the offense, the defendant may be entitled to a 
new preliminary hearing in order to engage in a meaningful cross-examination as it 
relates to the state's specific theory. Bush, 2001 UT 10, J^28 ("defendant is entitled to the 
opportunity to cross-examine the State's witnesses [anew] with respect to the new 
[amended] charge"). 
In this case, the state charged Harris with general theft under Section 76-6-404. 
(R. 2-4.) During the preliminary hearing, the state did not suggest that it would amend 
the charge to allege any different or specific theory of the crime under the law. (R. 191.) 
Indeed, the prosecutor argued that "we have shown probable cause to believe that the 
defendant has committed the crime of theft. A person commits [theft] under the Code of 
the crime of theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control of the property of 
another with the purpose to deprive him thereof." (R. 191:24-25.) The state then argued 
that the evidence supported general theft. (Id.) 
Counsel for Harris disagreed with the state. "It's not unauthorized control. It's not 
theft." (R. 191:26.) Defense counsel then claimed that the state arguably may have a 
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stronger case for the specific variation of "theft by deception." (R. 191:26.) Yet, as 
defense counsel argued at the preliminary hearing, the state did not charge that specific 
variation. (Id.) In addition, the evidence presented in this matter would not support a 
charge either for general theft or the specific variation of theft by deception. (See R. 191, 
generally; see also 192: Tab 1:2 (defense counsel consistently argued that the state failed 
to present sufficient evidence to support a crime).) 
Thereafter, in papers filed with Judge Lewis, the state argued the evidence sup-
ported the specific variation of "theft by deception." (R. 117.) Under the Code, the 
crime of theft by deception is defined as follows: 
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises control over property of 
another by deception and with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
(2) Theft by deception does not occur, however, when there is only falsity as to 
matters having no pecuniary significance, or puffing by statements unlikely to 
deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed. "Puffing" means an exaggerated 
commendation of wares or worth in communications addressed to the public or to 
a class or group. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1999). Significantly, the state did not seek to have the in-
formation amended to support that alternative theory. See Bush. 2001 UT App 10, THJ27-
29 (state's request to amend information is subject to defendant's right to fair notice, 
which may include a new preliminary hearing). 
Even if the state had requested an amendment for theft by deception, as further set 
forth below, the state's evidence in this case was insufficient to support either the general 
crime of "theft," or the specific variation of "theft by deception." 
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2. The Evidence Failed to Support Either Theft or Theft by Deception. 
As stated above, the general crime of "theft" and the more specific crime of "theft 
by deception," both require the state to establish the following elements at the preliminary 
hearing: that the defendant [1] obtained or exercised control, [2] over the property of 
another, [3] with a purpose to deprive him thereof. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404 (theft 
also requires proof of "unauthorized control"); 76-6-405 (theft by deception also requires 
proof of deception). In this case, the state failed to show that Harris exercised control 
"over the property of another with the purpose to deprive him thereof." The state also 
failed to establish "unauthorized control" for theft; and "deception" for the specific 
variation. 
Specifically, the evidence considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution 
supports that the Praags and Harris entered into a contract, wherein Harris agreed to build 
cabinets with "melamine and cherry wood interiors" and other features for installation in 
the Praags' home, and the Praags agreed to pay the amount of $14,100. The contract 
provided that the Praags were to pay 50% of the price at the time of the contract, 25% of 
the price on delivery of the cabinets, and the balance upon completion of the project. 
(See R. 191:14-15, Exhibit 1 (Contract, dated May 3,2000).) Harris and the Praags 
signed the contract. Although the "contract" did not specify the date of performance 
(see id), Mrs. Praag testified that the work was to be completed by July 21,2000. (R. 
191:3.) The contract also provided that Harris would pay a "$50 late penalty after 21" if 
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Harris was late in performing on the contract and it delayed in the closing on the Praags' 
home. (R. 191:14-15, Exhibit 1; 61-62 ("Stipulated Facts").) 
Thereafter, the Praags did not provide Harris with the down payment until May 10, 
2000. On that date, the Praags' general contractor prepared a check made payable to 
Harris in the amount of $7,000. (R. 191:10.) The general contractor asked Harris to hold 
on to the check until "the actual funds were transferred" to the Praags' account, which 
was on May 15. (R. 191:11.) Harris deposited the check on May 15. (Id.) 
On or about May 17, Mrs. Praag began to have concerns about Harris' ability to 
perform on the contract. (R. 191:4, 10 (the Praags' contractor gave a check to Harris on 
May 10; a week later the Praags had concerns).) The Praags contacted Harris and he 
assured them that he would do the work. (R. 191:4-5.) This did not allay Mrs. Praags' 
concerns. (R. 191:5.) Harris also said he was one-third of the way finished. (Id.) 
On July 13, before Harris was due to perform on the contract, the Praags contacted 
him again. This time, Harris admitted "that he actually really hadn't started our cabinets." 
He also admitted that he had spent the $7,000 down payment. (R. 191:6.) 
At that point, the Praags decided to terminate the contract with Harris. They had a 
letter prepared demanding that Harris "repay" the down payment by July 21. (R. 191:7, 
11-12; Exhibit 2.) Harris informed the Praags that he was unable to pay the money by 
that date. (R. 191:7.) He requested more time, and the Praags "extend[ed] that until 
August 18th." (R. 191:7.) Harris signed the Praags'letter terminating the contract. (R. 
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191:7, 11-12; Exhibit 2.) According to the "Stipulated Facts," Harris "did not pay the 
Praags the $7,000 he had agreed to refund." (R. 61.) 
The facts fail to establish the general crime of theft. The evidence fails to support 
that Harris obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the down payment. By way 
of explanation, the May 3 contract required Harris to build and install cabinets for the 
Praags' home and it required the Praags to pay 50% of the contract price. The Praags' 
contractor made the down payment on May 10, and then asked Harris not to deposit the 
funds until she gave him authorization. Harris complied with the request. He did not 
deposit the check until he was specifically authorized to do so. On May 15, the 
contractor gave Harris permission to cash the check. The evidence is undisputed. It 
supports that Harris was authorized to cash the check. He obtained authorized control 
over the funds. 
Next, the contract did not specify how Harris was required to use the funds. It did 
not obligate Harris to use the funds only on materials for and services provided in 
connection with the Praags'cabinets. (See R. 191:14-15, Exhibit 1.) Likewise, the 
Praags did not testify that they had any expectation that the funds would be used in such 
an exclusive fashion. (See R. 191, in general.) 
Indeed, in this case, the contract reflects no such expectation on the Praags' part. 
While the Praags agreed to provide a down payment (see R. 191:14-15, Exhibit 1), Harris 
then was required to build and deliver all cabinets before the Praags would be required to 
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pay anything further. (Id.) Harris would be finally paid for the project after he 
completed installation of the cabinets. (Id) The arrangement recognized that Harris used 
money as it came in for various projects. Also, in this case, the state failed to show that 
the Praags placed any restrictions or limitations on the use of the down payment. Thus, 
the state failed to present any evidence to support that Harris exercised unauthorized 
control over the property of another. See State v. Burton, 800 P.2d 817, 819 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990) (since the terms of the contract did not create an express duty as to how 
defendant should use the funds, the state could not establish theft). 
In this case, the state was unable to show that Harris "obtain[ed] or exercis[ed] 
unauthorized control" over the down payment. The evidence failed to support theft. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404. 
Next, under the specific variation of theft by deception, the evidence considered in 
the light most favorable to the prosecution fails to establish any deception on Harris' 
part. The Utah Code specifies that "failure to perform the promise in issue without other 
evidence of intent or knowledge is not sufficient proof 'that the actor did not intend to 
perform or knew the promise would not be performed." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
401(5)(e) (1999) (emphasis added). That is, the state must establish something more 
than breach of contract. 
Here, Harris entered into the contract with the Praags on May 3. The Praags 
delayed in making any down payment to Harris until funds cleared their account on May 
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15. (R. 191:10-11, 14-15, Exhibit 1.) The state failed to present any evidence of criminal 
intent or knowledge on Harris' part where the initial contract was concerned. That is, 
there is no evidence to support that Harris made a false or untrue statement in order to 
affect the judgment of the Praags in entering into the contract or making the down 
payment. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401(5). 
Thereafter, the Praags became concerned with Harris' ability to perform on the 
contract. On or about May 17, Mrs. Praag contacted him and expressed her concern. 
Harris told Mrs. Praag that he had started the work on the cabinets. (R. 191:4-5.) Mrs. 
Praag testified that Harris's statements did not address her concerns. (R. 191:5.) She 
was skeptical about his ability to perform the work. (R. 191:5.) On July 13, Mrs. Praag 
confronted Harris again. This time, he admitted "he actually really hadn't started our 
cabinets." (R. 191:6.) Also, he told Mis. Praag, "I've spent the money." (R. 191:6.) 
On July 14, the Praags terminated the contract. The work on the contract was not 
completed by July 21 (see R. 191:3-4 (Mrs. Praag testified that Harris failed to complete 
the work by July 21)) because the Praags canceled the contract prior to the due date. (R. 
191:7-8.) The Praags' conduct affected the transaction and released Harris from 
performing as scheduled. 
Those facts do not support that Harris was deceptive. There is no evidence that 
Harris entered into the contract or accepted the money promising to perform when he did 
not intend to perform; there is no evidence that he provided a false impression that 
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affected the Praags' judgment in entering the contract; and there is no evidence that 
Harris promised performance with criminal intent. In this case, the state simply 
demonstrated that Harris "fail[ed] to perform the promise in issue." Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-40 l(5)(e). 
Indeed, even if this Court were to find that Harris' statement to Mrs. Praag on or 
about May 17 misrepresented the situation about the cabinets (R. 191:4-6 (Mrs. Praag 
testified that Harris told her on about May 17 that he had started the cabinets; then he 
told her on July 13 that "he actually really hadn't started our cabinets")), Mrs. Praag 
admitted that Harris' statements did not alleviate her concerns. She felt he "basically 
blew it off." (R. 191:5.) Thus, the state cannot show that the alleged misrepresentation 
somehow "affect[ed] the judgment" of the Praags in the matter. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 
76-6-40l(5)(a) and 76-6-405(2). Also, as Mrs. Praag admitted, on July 13, Harris 
"corrected]" any false impression that Mrs. Praag may have had about his work on the 
project. He told her he had not started the project. (R. 191:6); Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
401(5)(b).2 
2 In the event the state's evidence also established that Harris made misrepresentations to 
the officer in October about his work on the cabinets, those misrepresentations are irrele-
vant, since the Praags did not rely on them in this case and the statements did not affect 
the Praags' judgment in the matter. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401(5) (for "deception" 
to be criminal, it must "affect the judgment" of the other party to the transaction); see 
also id. at § 76-6-405(2) (recognizing that a falsity that has no pecuniary significance 
does not constitute "deception"). At the time Harris made the representation, the Praags 
had already terminated the original contract prior to the performance date. 
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In the end, the state failed to present "other evidence" to support deceptive "intent 
or knowledge" as required under the specific variation of theft by deception. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-40 l(5)(e). Under Utah law, a simple breach of performance will not 
support criminal conduct. Id. 
In analogous cases, other courts have found that breach of contract does not give 
rise to criminal conduct. In State v. Amanns. 2 S.W. 3d 241 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999), 
defendant was convicted of theft for failing to relinquish a down payment on a 
construction contract after the homeowner terminated the contract with defendant. The 
court described the facts as follows: 
The material facts of this case are not in dispute. In early July, 1994, the 
appellant, a contractor, entered into a written contract with Ms. Otey Sue 
Reynolds to remodel the basement of her home. The agreed contract price was 
$16,000. The terms provided that the appellant would be paid an initial amount 
of $6,000, a second payment after the project was fifty percent complete, and the 
balance due upon completion. On July 21, 1994, Ms. Reynolds paid the appellant 
$6,000 by check. The following day, the appellant cashed the $6,000 check. On 
this same day, he deposited the sum of $1,760.57 with 84 Lumber Company in 
Knoxville for the purchase of estimated materials to be used in the remodeling 
project. The appellant advised 84 Lumber that these materials were being 
purchased for improvements to Ms. Reynolds1 house. The proof established that 
the appellant was under no contractual obligation to establish any such account. 
Moreover, Ms. Reynolds had no possessory interest in the funds in the account. 
The appellant began work on August 1, 1994. The first day involved only the 
unloading of some materials. The following day, he returned to Ms. Reynolds1 
home around 10:00 a.m. and worked until 3:50 p.m. for a period of approximately 
six hours. Upon the appellant's arrival at the Reynolds home the third day, Ms. 
Reynolds was obviously displeased with the quality of workmanship and advised 
the appellant, "I can't have work like this in my house." The appellant testified 
that he was told by Ms. Reynolds, ffI don't like your work at all. I don't want you 
to work here no more." Following the exchange, the appellant loaded his tools 
32 
and materials and left. No further work was performed. Ms. Reynolds testified 
that she attempted to contact the appellant by phone that day by leaving a message 
on his recorder. Within the next two days, Ms. Reynolds called her attorney 
about the matter. Approximately two days later, the appellant received a letter 
from Ms. Reynolds1 attorney advising him that he was to have no further contact 
with Ms. Reynolds. At the appellant's request on August 5, 1994, 84 Lumber 
issued a check in the sum of $1,494.50, representing the balance of his deposit for 
the Reynolds job. 
Amanns. 2 S.W.3d at 242-43. The appellant/defendant did not refund the money to the 
homeowner. Id. 
After atrial, the defendant was convicted of general theft. LdLat242. He 
appealed from the conviction. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that the 
facts could not support the conviction. "It is undisputed that the appellant lawfully 
obtained possession of the $6,000 at which time Ms. Reynolds relinquished all of her 
interest in the money. Moreover, the record is void of any proof that the appellant took 
possession of the $6,000 with the intent to convert the money to his own use." Id. at 245. 
While the defendant failed to return a portion of the down payment, "these facts establish 
a breach of contract, they fall far short of establishing, beyond a reasonable doubt, any 
intent to defraud." Id. 
Also, in Cox v. State. 658 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983), the defendant was 
convicted of theft for breach of contract on a kitchen remodel. The appellate court 
reversed the conviction. IcL 
The facts in Cox reflected the following: Complainant purchased a house which 
needed repairs. Defendant did some of the repairs and was paid. The complainant then 
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identified work in the kitchen that needed to be done, including the purchase and 
installation of a stove, oven, range top, and venting hood. Id. at 669-70. Appellant 
agreed to do the work for $600.00. After defendant was paid, he purchased the oven but 
did not connect it. Complainant also asked the defendant to install a sink she had 
purchased from Sears and to install countertops. IdL. Defendant requested additional 
money for that project, which complainant paid. Defendant also offered to pick the sink 
up from Sears, and complainant gave him the receipt for it. Although defendant 
promised to do the work that evening, he did not return for two days. IcL 
When complainant ultimately confronted defendant later, he had the sink and 
promised to do the work. Again he failed to do so. IjLat 670. For several days 
thereafter, complainant was unable to reach the defendant. When she finally was able to 
talk to him, he refused to explain why he would not finish the job, deliver the appliances 
or return the money. The defendant never reimbursed complainant and he was 
ultimately charged and convicted of theft. IdL. at 669-70. 
On appeal, the court ruled that the state's evidence failed to establish a false 
representation, and that the case "established no more than a dispute over appellant's 
performance of a kitchen remodeling contract." Id. at 671. "The mere fact that one fails 
to return or pay back money after failing to perform a contract, for the performance of 
which the money was paid in advance, does not constitute theft." Id. 
In this case, there is no way to know to what extent Harris was able to perform on 
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the contract by July 21, since the Praags terminated the contract with Harris before that 
date. Also, according to the evidence, on the day the Praags entered into the contract 
with Harris, they specifically acknowledged the possibility that he would not be able to 
perform by July 21. The Praags signed the contract, which included a "$50 late penalty 
after [July] 21" if Harris was late on the project and it delayed closing on the Praags' 
home. (R. 191:14-15, Exhibit 1; 61-62.) The Praags' recognized at the time of the 
contract that performance may be late. Thereafter, the Praags canceled the contract 
before Harris was required to perform. 
Under the law, the Praags may have a civil claim against Harris for breach of 
contract or unjust enrichment. Indeed, under Utah law, a civil claim for unjust 
enrichment requires proof of three factors: 
First, there must be a benefit conferred on one person by another. [See Berrett v. 
Stevens, 690 P.2d 553, 557 (Utah 1984).] Second, the conferee must appreciate or 
have knowledge of the benefit. See. kL Finally, there must be "the acceptance or 
retention by the conferee of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it 
inequitable for the conferee to retain the benefit without payment of its value." 
Id. The plaintiff must prove all three elements to sustain a claim of unjust 
enrichment. 
Desert Mariah. Inc. v. B & L Auto, Inc.. 2000 UT 83, f 13, 12 P.3d 580. The claims in 
Harris' case may be more properly pursued in civil court. 
Without additional evidence, the state is unable to establish unauthorized control 
for a general theft charge. The undisputed facts support that the Praags authorized the 
down payment to Harris, and they did not place any limitations on his use of the money. 
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In addition, the state's evidence fails to support deception. The evidence fails to 
establish that Harris made any misrepresentation to the Praags in connection with 
entering into the contract or making the down payment. There is no "other evidence of 
intent or knowledge" for deception as required by statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
401(5)(e).3 On that basis, the Motion to Quash should have been granted. 
3. The State Is Precluded From Arguing Any Other Theory for Theft Here. Since 
Any Other Alternative Theory Has Not Been Presented Below Through the Proper 
Channels. Also, Alternative Theories Would Implicate the Law Set Forth in Bush. 
The state did not indicate in the court below that it intended to pursue any other 
theory of theft against Harris. (See record generally.) In the event the state intended to 
proceed with an alternative specific theory it was required to file a request to amend the 
information. See Bush, 2001 UT App 10. Since the state did not file such a request 
below, it is not necessary at this juncture for the parties to demonstrate whether the 
evidence supports any other specific theory of theft. Indeed, any other alternative theory 
should be pursued through the proper channels in the lower court. If the state is able to 
present any other theory, even on the record as it exists, Harris may be entitled to cross-
examine the witnesses anew in light of the amended charge. See Bush, 2001 UT App 10, 
3 In the event the state tries to claim that the criminal conduct occurred when Harris 
signed the July 14 letter requiring him to repay the down payment, that conduct likewise 
does not rise to a criminal level. The letter essentially acknowledges that the Praags 
initially relinquished control of the $7,000 to Harris, and they demanded that Harris repay 
the money. The Praags had the letter drawn up by their attorney and it included their 
language. There is no evidence that Harris made any representations to support a claim of 
"deception" there. 
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ffi[27-29; supra, subpoint C.I., herein. 
Indeed, it is not necessary for this Court to determine sufficiency of the evidence 
for the bindover. The question here is whether the trial court had a complete record of the 
preliminary hearing to decide the Motion to Quash. The trial court was not at liberty to 
disregard the "Stipulated Facts," and order an additional evidentiary hearing to 
supplement the preliminary hearing, where the state would be entitled to present whatever 
evidence it wished. The law does not permit such proceedings. This Court should 
reverse the trial court's order in that regard. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Harris respectfully requests that this Court enter 
an order vacating that portion of the trial court's January 16 order providing for further 
evidentiary proceedings. Also, Harris respectfully requests that this Court direct the trial 
court to rule on the Motion to Quash based on the transcript of the existing preliminary 
hearing and the "Stipulated Facts." 
SUBMITTED this f£_day of ^cyjt^^L.^ , 2002. 
^ ?#&& 
LINDA M. JONES 
STEPHEN HOWARD" 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
Counsel for the Appellant/Defendant 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
JEFF RAY HARRIS, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Case No. 001919065 
Hon. Leslie A. Lewis 
Defendant's argument on the defendant's Motion to Quash the Bindover was heard on 
November 28, 2001. The transcript of the Preliminary Hearing was provided, however, it is 
incomplete due to technical difficulties during the hearing. The State and the defendant have 
stipulated to the testimony which was absent from the transcript, and provided that stipulation to 
the Court. The Court is not satisfied that the evidence presented supports the bindover, and will 
hear the live testimony which was not recorded in the transcript, along with any other live 
testimony the State would like to present. The Court will rely on the live testimony presented 
and the transcript from the Preliminary Hearing. The case will not be remanded to Judge 
Lindberg. _ - J , 
1^  •rL. DATED this.ilth-day of Deeember^Oak -
BYTK^COURT: 
^ 
k> >fc •••*••. I 3 i I I 
LESLIE A. LEWIS, District Judge 
ORDER 
Case No. 001919065 
Page 2 
Approved as to form: 
Stephen W. Howard 
ORDER 
Case No. 001919065 
Page 3 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was delivered to 
Stephen W. Howard, Attorney for Defendant Jeff Ray Harris, at 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on the day of December, 2001. 
ADDENDUM B 
State of Utah, 
Respondent, 
v. 
Jeff Ray Harris 
Petitioner. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
APR 2 9 2002 
PautetteStagg 
Ctefk of the Court 
ORDER 
Case No. 20020085-CA 
Before Judges Jackson, Bench, and Orme. 
This matter is before the court on a petition for permission 
to appeal from an interlocutory order filed pursuant to Rule 5 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for permission to 
appeal is granted. 
DATED this of April, 2002. 
FOR THE COURT: 
aL. 
Q K.^rm udge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 29th day of April, 2002, a true and 
correct copy of the attached Order was deposited in the United 
States mail to: 
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR. 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 E 300 S 6TH FL 
PO BOX 140854 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854 
STEPHEN W. HOWARD 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 E 500 S STE 300 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
and a true and correct copy of the attached ORDER was deposited 
in the United States mail to the judge listed below: 
HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE 
450 S STATE ST 
PO BOX 1860 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860 
c r e ^ a ^ ^ 
TRIAL COURT: THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE, 001919065 
APPEALS CASE NO.: 20020085-CA 
ADDENDUM C 
UTAH RCLKS OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 7. Proceedings before magistrate. 
(a) When a summons is issued in lieu of a warrant of arrest, the defendant 
shall appear before the court as directed in the summons. 
(b) When any peace officer (>v 01 her person makes an arrest with or without 
a warrant , the person arrested shall be taken to the nearest available 
magistrate for setting of bail. If an information has not been filed, one shall be 
filed without delay before the magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense. 
(c)(1) If a person is arrested in a county other than where the offense was 
committed the person arrested shall without unnecessary delay be returned to 
the county where the crime was committed and shall he taken before the 
proper magistrate under these rules. 
(2) If for any reason the person arrested cannot be promptly returned to the 
county and the charge against the defendant is a misdemeanor for which a 
voluntary forfeiture of bail may be entered as a conviction under Subsection 
77-7-21(1), the person arrested may state in writing a desire to forfeit bail, 
waive trial in the district in which the information is pending, and consent to 
disposition of the case in the county in which the person was arrested, is held, 
or is present. 
(3) Upon receipt of the defendant's statement, the clerk of the court in which 
the information is pending shall transmit the papers in the proceeding or 
copies of them to the clerk of the court for the county in which the defendant 
is arrested, held, or present. The prosecution shall continue in that county. 
(4) Forfeited bail shall be returned to the jurisdiction that issued the 
warrant . 
(5) If the defendant is charged with an offense other than a misdemeanor for 
which a voluntary forfeiture of bail may be entered as a conviction under 
Subsection 77-7-21(1), the defendant shall be taken without unnecessary delay 
before a magistrate within the county of arrest for the determination of bail 
under Section 77-20-1 and released on bail or held without bail under Section 
77-20-1. 
(6) Bail shall be returned to the magistrate having jurisdiction over the 
offense, with the record made of the proceedings before the magistrate. 
(d) The magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense charged shall, upon 
the defendant's first appearance, infoim the defendant: 
(1) of the charge in the information or indictment and furnish a copy; 
(2) of any affidavit or recorded testimony given in support of the information 
and how to obtain them; 
(3) of the right to retain counsel or have counsel appointed by the court 
without expense if unable to obtain counsel; 
(4) of rights concerning pretrial release, including bail; and 
(5) that the defendant is not required to make any statement, and that the 
statements the defendant does make may be used against the defendant in a 
court of law. 
(e) The magistrate shall, after providing the information under paragraph 
(d> and before proceeding further, allow the defendant reasonable time and 
opportunity to consult counsel and shall allow the defendant to contact any 
attorney by any reasonable means, without delay and without fee. 
(f) If the charge against the defendant is a misdemeanor, the magistrate 
shall call upon the defendant to enter a plea. 
(1) If the plea is guilty, the defendant shall be sentenced by the magistrate 
as provided by law7. 
(2) If the plea is not guilty, a trial date shall be set. The date may not be 
extended except for good cause shown. Trial shall be held under these rules 
and law applicable to criminal cases 
(g)(1) If a defendant is charged with a felony, the defendant shall be advised 
of the right to a preliminary examination. If the defendant waives the right to 
a preliminary examination, and the prosecuting attorney consents, the mag-
istrate shall order the defendant bound over to answer in the district court. 
(2) If ihe defendant does not waive a preliminary examination, the magis-
trate shall schedule the preliminary examination. The examination shall be 
held within a reasonable time, but n<<! later than ten days if the defendant is 
in custody for the offense charged and not later than 30 days if the defendant 
is not in custodv These time periods may be extended by the magistrate for 
good cause shown. A preliminary, examination may not be held if the defendant 
is indicted. 
(h)(l) Unless otherwise provided, a preliminary examination shall be held 
under the rules and laws applicable to criminal cases tried before a court. The 
state has the burden of proof and shall proceed first with its case. At the 
conclusion of the state's case, the defendant may testify under oath, call 
witnesses, and present evidence The defendant may also cross-examine 
adverse witnesses. 
(2) If from the evidence a magistrate finds probable cause to believe that the 
crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed it, 
the magistrate shall order, in writing, that the defendant be bound over to 
answer in the district court. The findings of probable cause may be based on 
hearsay in whole or in part. Objections to evidence on the ground that it was 
acquired by unlawful means are not properly raised at the preliminary 
examination. 
(3) If the magistrate does not find probable cause to believe that the crime 
charged has been committed or that the defendant committed it, the magis-
trate shall dismiss the information and discharge the defendant. The magis-
trate may enter findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order of dismissal. 
The dismissal and discharge do not preclude the state from instituting a 
subsequent prosecution for the same offense. 
(i) At a preliminary examination, the magistrate, upon request of either 
party, may exclude witnesses from the courtroom and may require witnesses 
not to converse with each other until the preliminary examination is con-
cluded. On the request of either party, the magistrate may order all spectators 
to be excluded from the courtroom. 
(j)(l) If the magistrate oiders the defendant bound over to the district court, 
the magistrate shall execute in writing a bind-over order and shall transmit to 
the clerk of the district court all pleadings in and records made of the 
proceedings before the magistrate, including exhibits, recordings, and any 
typewritten transcript. 
(2) When a magistrate commits a defendant to the custody of the sheriff, the 
magistrate shall execute the appropriate commitment order. 
(k)d^ When a magistrate has good cause to believe that any material 
witness in a pending case will not appear and testify unless bond is required, 
the magistrate may fix a bond with or without sureties and in a sum considered 
adequate for the appearance of the witness. 
(2) If the witness fails or refuses to post the bond with the clerk of the court, 
the magistrate may commit the witness to jail until the witness complies or is 
otherwise legally discharged. 
(3) If the witness does provide bond when required, the witness may be 
examined and cross-examined before the magistrate in the presence of the 
defendant and the testimony shall be recorded. The witness shall then be 
discharged. 
(4) If the witness is unavailable or fails to appear at any subsequent hearing 
or trial when ordered to do t»o, the recorded testimony may be used at the 
hearing or trial in lieu of the personal testimonv of the witness. 
(Amended effective May 1. 1993; November 1, 1996; April 29, 1998; April 1, 
1999.) 
UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
76-6-401. Definitions. 
For the purposes of this part: 
(1) "Property'' means anything of value, including real estate, tangible 
and intangible personal property, captured or domestic animals and birds, 
written instruments or other writings representing or embodying rights 
concerning real or personal property, labor, services, or otherwise contain-
ing anything of value to the owner, commodities of a public utility nature 
such as telecommunications, gas, electricity, steam, or water, and trade 
secrets, meaning the whole or any portion of any scientific or technical 
information, design, process, procedure, formula or invention which the 
owner thereof intends to be available only to persons selected by him. 
(2) "Obtain" means, in relation to property, to bring about a transfer of 
possession or of some other legally recognized interest in property, 
whether to the obtainer or another; in relation to labor or services, to 
secure performance thereof; and in relation to a trade secret, to make any 
facsimile, replica, photograph, or other reproduction. 
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious object: 
(a) To withhold property permanently or for so extended a period or 
to use under such circumstances that a substantial portion of its 
economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof, would be lost; or 
(b) To restore the property only upon payment of a reward or other 
compensation; or 
(c) To dispose of the property under circumstances that make it 
unlikely that the owner will recover it. 
(4) "Obtain or exercise unauthorized control" means, but is not neces-
sarily limited to, conduct heretofore defined or known as common-law 
larceny by trespassory taking, larceny by conversion, larceny by bailee, 
and embezzlement. 
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person intentionally: 
(a) Creates or confirms by words or conduct an impression of law or 
fact that is false and that the actor does not believe to be true and that 
is likely to affect the judgment of another in the transaction; or 
(b) Fails to correct a false impression of law or fact that the actor 
previously created or confirmed by words or conduct that is likely to 
affect the judgment of another and that the actor does not now believe 
to be true; or 
(c) Prevents another from acquiring information likely to affect his 
judgment in the transaction; or 
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or encumbers property without 
disclosing a lien, security interest, adverse claim, or other legal 
impediment to the enjoyment of the property, whether the lien, 
security interest, claim, or impediment is or is not valid or is or is not 
a matter of official record; or 
(e) Promises performance that is likely to affect the judgment of 
another in the transaction, which performance the actor does not 
intend to perform or knows will not be performed; provided, however, 
that failure to perform the promise in issue without other evidence of 
intent or knowledge is not sufficient proof that the actor did not intend 
to perform or knew the promise would not be performed. 
76-6-403. Theft — Evidence to support accusation. 
Conduct denominated theft in this part constitutes a single offense embrac-
ing the separate offenses such as those heretofore known as larceny, larceny by 
trick, larceny by bailees, embezzlement, false pretense, extortion, blackmail, 
receiving stolen property. An accusation of theft may be supported by evidence 
that it was committed in any manner specified in Sections 76-6-404 through 
76-6-410, subject to the power of the court to ensure a fair trial by granting a 
continuance or other appropriate relief where the conduct of the defense would 
be prejudiced by lack of fair notice or by surprise. 
76-6-404. Theft — Elements. 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over 
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
76-6-405. Theft by deception. 
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises control over property of 
another by deception and with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
(2) Theft by deception does not occur, however, when there is only falsity as 
to matters having no pecuniary significance, or puffing by statements unlikely 
to deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed. "Puffing" means an 
exaggerated commendation of wares or worth in communications addressed to 
the public or to a class or group. 
